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One Parcel Plus One Parcel 
Equals a “Parcel as a Whole”
Murr v. Wisconsin’s Fluid Calculations for Regulatory Takings
By Shelby D. Green
Shelby D. Green is a professor of law at 
the Elisabeth Haub School of Law at Pace 
University in White Plains, New York, and 
the editor of “Keeping Current—Property” 
for Probate & Property. 
T
he Court’s most recent major 
property law case, Murr v. Wis-
consin, 137 S. Ct. 1933 (2017), 
tackles one of the thorny, recur-
ring issues in regulatory takings 
jurisprudence: what is the proper 
“denominator” to use in determining 
whether a government regulation has 
so greatly diminished the economic 
value of a parcel of land that it effects 
a taking? More speciically, Murr 
looked at what constitutes the “parcel 
as a whole” when a landowner holds 
title to two contiguous lots. Should a 
court assess the economic impact on 
the value of each lot separately or the 
impact on the value of the two lots 
together? In answering that question, 
the Court added another multi-fac-
tored test to the already complex web 
of regulatory takings law.   
Development of Regulatory 
Takings Jurisprudence
In Penn Central Transportation Co. v. 
City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978), 
the Supreme Court upheld the appli-
cation of New York City’s landmarks 
preservation law, spoiling the own-
er’s plans to construct an ofice tower 
atop the elegant Beaux Art Grand 
Central Terminal. The owner asserted 
that because 100% of its right to build 
atop the terminal (its air rights) was 
barred by the ordinance, there was 
a taking of property requiring com-
pensation. But the Supreme Court 
conceived the burdens from the ordi-
nance differently, looking at the 
whole parcel, including the existing 
building. The Court explained: 
“Taking” jurisprudence does not 
divide a single parcel into dis-
crete segments and attempt to 
determine whether rights in a 
particular segment have been 
entirely abrogated. In deciding 
whether a particular governmen-
tal action has effected a taking, 
this Court focuses rather both 
on the character of the action 
and on the nature and extent of 
the interference with rights in 
the parcel as a whole—here, the 
city tax block designated as the 
“landmark site.”
Id. at 130–31 (emphasis added). In 
fact, the land underneath the Penn 
Central operations comprised six lots, 
although the site for the proposed 
tower rested on only one legally 
deined lot.
Takings jurisprudence derives 
from the Fifth Amendment (private 
property shall not “be taken for pub-
lic use, without just compensation”). 
Since 1922, in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. 
Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922), the clause 
has been read to apply not only to the 
government’s direct appropriation of 
property or its functional equivalent 
(like permanent looding) but also to 
the burdensome effects of land use 
regulations. The Court allowed that 
“property may be regulated to a cer-
tain extent,” but pronounced that “if 
regulation goes too far it will be rec-
ognized as a taking.” Id. at 415. In 
elucidating that point, Justice Oliver 
Wendell Holmes offered little more 
than his characteristic poetry: 
Government hardly could go on 
if to some extent values incident 
to property could not be dimin-
ished without paying for every 
such change in the general law. 
As long recognized some values 
are enjoyed under an implied 
limitation and must yield to the 
police power. But obviously the 
implied limitation must have its 
limits or the contract and due 
process clauses are gone.
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Id. at 413. The Court went on to 
reverse a lower court ruling on a stat-
ute that forbade the mining of coal 
in such a way as to cause the subsid-
ence of structures used for human 
habitation.
In Penn Central, the Court artic-
ulated the now-prevailing test for 
regulatory takings, one that had been 
developing in the years after Penn-
sylvania Coal. Though in the guise of 
a mathematical equation, there was 
no “set formula,” the test lacked cer-
tainty in the calculation and result 
and offered little guidance for staying 
clear of Justice Holmes’s line. Instead, 
the three-part calculus embraces mul-
tiple variables and luid measures. Id. 
Under the Penn Central ad hoc test, 
when a regulation impedes the use 
of property without depriving the 
owner of all economically beneicial 
use, a taking may be found based on 
several factors, including (1) the eco-
nomic impact of the regulation on the 
claimant, (2) the extent to which the 
regulation has interfered with distinct 
investment-backed expectations, and 
(3) the character of the governmental 
action. 438 U.S. at 124. 
Years later, in Lucas v. South Car-
olina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 
(1992), the Court recognized that 
some regulations may overwhelm 
all of the fruits of ownership. In the 
“extraordinary circumstance when no 
productive or economically benei-
cial use of land is permitted,” there is 
a categorical taking. Id. at 1017, 1019. 
This exception to the Penn Central ad 
hoc test is made only when the bur-
den of the regulation is complete. 
This means that if “the diminution 
in value is 95% instead of 100%,” the 
categorical takings claim fails and the 
takings analysis focuses on the three 
Penn Central factors. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. 
Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning 
Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 330 (2002). 
The Court took the opportunity to 
extend its regulatory takings jurispru-
dence in Murr. More than a century 
after the advent of regulatory takings 
jurisprudence, the Court admitted 
that it still has not crafted deinitive 
rules to guide this area of takings 
law. 137 S. Ct. at 1942. The Court did 
not undertake to square up the entire 
analysis in Murr, but only to give 
some direction for one part of the 
test—the “parcel as a whole” compo-
nent. Whether the additions portend 
greater ease of analysis is not certain. 
The Lands of the Murrs and  
the Regulatory Limits
Under the Penn Central analysis of the 
economic impact of a regulation, the 
ultimate question is what portion of 
the property’s value the challenged 
action depresses; the greater the por-
tion, the more likely it may be found 
to be a taking. In Penn Central, the 
property owner contended that 100% 
of its air rights were taken. But a 
majority of the Court found that air 
rights were not the proper denomina-
tor; instead, the Court considered air 
rights to be only part of the “parcel as 
a whole.” 438 U.S. at 131. Murr pre-
sented the denominator question in 
the context of a landowner who holds 
contiguous lots. 
The Murrs’ parents acquired Lot 
F in 1960 (later transferring owner-
ship to a family plumbing business) 
and the adjacent Lot E, which they 
held in their own names, in 1963. 
They built a three-bedroom cabin on 
Lot F and used Lot E for parking, vol-
leyball, and general recreation. The 
topography of the lots is rough and 
rugged with a steep bluff that cuts 
through the middle of each; the only 
level land suitable for development 
is that above the bluff and next to the 
water below it. Id. at 1940. Although 
each lot is approximately 1.25 acres, 
because of the geography, less than 
one acre of each lot is suitable for 
development and, even when com-
bined, the buildable area of the lots is 
only 0.98 acres. Id. 
The parents transferred title to the 
two lots to their children on differ-
ent dates: Lot F in 1994 and Lot E in 
1995. The lots were within an area 
long-admired for its “picturesque 
grandeur,” the St. Croix River sce-
nic area. Id. at 1939–40. The beauty 
of the area was preserved under the 
Wild and Scenic Rivers Act, 16 U.S.C 
§ 1274(a)(6), (9), which required the 
states of Wisconsin and Minnesota to 
develop “a management and devel-
opment program” for the river area. 
41 Fed. Reg. 26,237. Accordingly, Wis-
consin enacted the amendments to its 
administrative code that created the 
conundrum for the Murrs. First, legal 
lots were required to have at least one 
acre of land suitable for development. 
Wis. Admin. Code §§ NR 118.04(4), 
118.03(27), 118.06(1)(a)(2)(a), 118.06(1)(b). 
A grandfather clause, however, 
relaxed this restriction for substandard 
lots that were “in separate owner-
ship from abutting lands” on January 
1, 1976, the effective date of the reg-
ulation, and permitted the use of 
qualifying lots as separate building 
sites. Wis. Admin. Code § NR 118.08(4)
(a)(1). Nevertheless, adjacent lots that 
came under common ownership were 
merged and could not be “sold or 
developed as separate lots” if they did 
not meet the size requirement (“the 
merger provision”). Wis. Admin. 
Code § NR 118.08(4)(a)(2). The county 
zoning ordinance contained identi-
cal restrictions. St. Croix County, Wis., 
Ord. § 17.36I.4.a. As is typical, the 
rules provided for variances in case of 
“unnecessary hardship.” Wis. Admin. 
Code § NR 118.09(4)(b); St. Croix 
County Ord. § 17.09.232. 
In    , the 
Court articulated the 
now prevailing test 
for regulatory takings, 
one that had been 
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A decade after the transfer from 
their parents, the Murrs sought to 
relocate the cabin to a different por-
tion of Lot F and to sell Lot E to 
obtain the funds for their plan. Much 
to their frustration, the transfer of the 
lots from their parents triggered the 
merger provision, which barred sepa-
rate sale or development. The Murrs 
could sell or build only on the single 
larger lot, but not on Lot E separately. 
Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 1941. Their request 
for a variance to sell Lot E was 
denied; the county suggested alter-
native uses—preserving the existing 
cabin on Lot F, or tearing down the 
cabin and building a new one on Lot 
E, on Lot F, or across both lots. Id. at 
1941. 
Finding none of the alternatives 
acceptable, the Murrs brought a reg-
ulatory takings claim in state court. 
In the challenge, they maintained 
that the value of Lot E, if sold as an 
unbuildable lot, was $40,000 but was 
approximately $400,000 if sold with-
out any restrictions; and that the 
value of Lots E and F, if sold together 
and with restrictions, was $698,300 
but was $771,000 if sold separately 
without restrictions. Id. at 1941. The 
trial court found the Murrs had the 
options for the use and enjoyment 
of their property as suggested by the 
county when it denied the variance. 
It also found that the Murrs had not 
been deprived of all economic value 
in their property. And, viewing the 
two lots as a single parcel, the court 
determined that the decrease in mar-
ket value was less than 10%, not a 
signiicant economic impact. 
The Wisconsin Court of Appeals 
afirmed, declining to analyze the 
effect of the regulation on Lot E 
alone. Instead, it ruled that the tak-
ings analysis “properly focused” on 
the regulations’ effect on the Murrs’ 
property as a whole—Lots E and 
F together. Id. This was so because 
the Murrs could not reasonably 
have expected to use the lots sepa-
rately because they were charged 
with knowledge of the regulations 
when they acquired the property. 
Any expectation to use the lots dif-
ferently became unreasonable when 
they chose to acquire Lot E in 1995, 
after having acquired Lot F in 1994, 
triggering the merger provisions. Id. 
at 1942. The court of appeals agreed 
with the trial court that the eco-
nomic impact from the regulation 
was minimal—only a 10% decline in 
value. The Wisconsin Supreme Court 
declined review and the matter came 
before the Supreme Court on petition 
for certiorari. The Court agreed with 
the state.
Parcel as a Whole
The Murrs did not contend that the 
Wisconsin rules deprived them of 
all the value of their land so as to 
make out a Lucas categorical taking 
(the lots could still be used as they 
always had been). Instead, they con-
tended that because Lot E could not 
be alienated or developed as a sepa-
rate parcel, there was a taking, subject 
to the Penn Central ad hoc test. Their 
claim was about the parcel as a whole 
component—the “denominator ques-
tion.” If the correct denominator was 
Lot E, then there was either a 90% or 
100% loss, very likely a taking requir-
ing compensation; but if it was Lots 
E and F as one parcel, then there was 
only a 10% loss, unlikely a suficient 
effect on value to establish a taking. 
From the irst regulatory takings 
case, the Court’s treatment of the 
“parcel as a whole” concept has been 
itful—some cases adopting it, if only 
sub silentio, others casting doubt on 
it, and yet others squarely adopting 
it and in novel contexts. Arguably, in 
Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 393, the 
Court treated just that part affected 
by the statute—the “support estate,” 
that is, the right to remove the strata 
of coal and earth that undergird the 
surface or instead to leave those lay-
ers intact to support the surface and 
prevent subsidence, as the denomi-
nator. But, in Keystone Bituminous 
Coal Ass’n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 
470 (1987), the Court viewed the sup-
port estate as an inextricable part of 
the mineral estate or surface estate, 
stating that it could not be used prof-
itably by one who does not also 
possess either the mineral estate or 
the surface estate. Id. at 498. Because 
the support estate has value only 
insofar as it protects or enhances the 
value of the estate with which it is 
associated, the interests should be 
considered as one parcel. Id. 
In Lucas, Justice Scalia found that 
although the proper factors for deter-
mining the denominator were unclear, 
the position taken by the state court 
in Penn Central (that is, to consider 
all of Penn Central’s property in the 
area) was “extreme . . . and unsup-
portable.” 505 U.S. at 1016 n.7. He 
suggested examining state property 
law as to “how the owner’s reasonable 
expectations have been shaped by the 
State’s law of property, i.e., whether 
and to what degree the State’s law has 
accorded legal recognition and protec-
tion to the particular interest.” Id. 
Then, in Concrete Pipe & Prod-
ucts of California, Inc. v. Construction 
Laborers Pension Trust for Southern Cal-
ifornia, 508 U.S. 602 (1993), the Court 
explained that “[t]o the extent that 
any portion of property is taken, that 
portion is always taken in its entirety; 
the relevant question, however, is 
whether the property taken is all, or 
only a portion of, the parcel in ques-
tion.” Id. at 644.
From the irst 
regulatory takings 
case, the Court’s 
treatment of the 
“parcel as a whole” 
concept has been itful.
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In Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 
606 (2001), a plurality of the Court 
granted that some cases endorse the 
parcel-as-a-whole rule but confessed 
that “we have at times expressed dis-
comfort” with it. Id. at 631. There, the 
landowner claimed his upland par-
cel was distinct from the regulated 
wetlands portions, so he should be 
permitted to assert a deprivation lim-
ited to the latter; but the point was 
not pressed in state courts, nor raised 
in the petition to the Court, and as 
such, the framed total deprivation 
argument failed. Id. at 632.
In Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, 535 
U.S. at 302, the Court ruled that a 
moratorium that precluded all devel-
opment for three years was not a total 
taking inasmuch as, when the mora-
torium ended, the landowners could 
once again enjoy all the attributes of 
a fee simple absolute title. The Court 
stated that it is the effect on the parcel 
as a whole, that is, the whole fee sim-
ple, in relation to the entire life of the 
property, that is relevant. Id. at 331–
32. “An interest in real property is 
deined by the metes and bounds that 
describe its geographic dimensions 
and the term of years that describes 
the temporal aspect of the owner’s 
interest. . . .  Both dimensions must 
be considered if the interest is to be 
viewed in its entirety.” Id. at 332.
Multi-Factor Test:  
Gaps, Leaps, and Offsets
Why logically does one parcel plus 
one parcel equal “a parcel as a whole” 
and not two parcels for purposes 
of the regulatory takings analy-
sis? In Murr, rather than applying 
the term “lot” or “parcel” literally, 
looking to the geographical or legal 
demarcations of the land to deter-
mine the relevant denominator, the 
Court adopted a “takings-speciic” 
meaning, one that is found under 
a multi-factor test. The stated aim 
is to determine whether reasonable 
expectations about property own-
ership would lead a landowner to 
anticipate that his holdings would 
be treated as one parcel, or, instead, 
as separate tracts. 137 S. Ct. at 1945. 
The starting factor is the treatment 
of the land under state and local law. 
On this point the Court stated that an 
acquirer of land must acknowledge 
“legitimate restrictions affecting his 
or her subsequent use and disposi-
tion of the property,” but it cautioned 
that those limits that are triggered 
only after a change in ownership may 
present a different case. Id. at 1945. 
A second factor focuses on the 
physical characteristics of the land, 
including the relationship of any dis-
tinguishable tracts, its topography, 
and the surrounding human and 
ecological environment, to deter-
mine, among other things, whether 
the property is in an area that is sub-
ject to, or likely to become subject to, 
environmental or other regulation. Id. 
at 1945–46. In this regard, an acquirer 
might expect prospective regula-
tions to protect and preserve the land, 
rather than the state simply address-
ing degradations under nuisance law. 
The third factor instructs courts to 
assess the positive effects of the regu-
lation, not only on the land directly 
affected by the regulation, but on 
adjacent, remaining land. Although a 
use restriction may decrease the mar-
ket value of the property, that effect 
may be tempered if the regulated 
land adds value to the remain-
ing property, such as by protecting 
views and allowing the expansion of 
a structure—beneits that counsel in 
favor of treatment of multiple parcels 
as a single one. Id. at 1946. 
All of those factors resolved 
against the Murrs. The state limits 
on sale and development of substan-
dard lots were in place at the time the 
Murrs acquired ownership. It was 
their “voluntary conduct” in bringing 
the lots into common ownership after 
the regulations were enacted that sub-
jected them to those limits—the valid 
merger provision under state law 
informed the expectations and fore-
cast the treatment of the two lots as 
a single property. Id. at 1948. It does 
not seem to matter that the grand-
father provisions in the regulations 
preserved the legal deinitions of the 
parcels and would have allowed the 
separate sale and development of Lot 
E by the parents. These rights did not 
extend to their transferees. 
The Court noted that the lots were 
contiguous and situated in an area 
of remarkable natural beauty; their 
physical coniguration and topog-
raphy made building on them as 
separate lots challenging to say the 
least. Id. at 1940. It is unclear whether 
the Court would have reached a dif-
ferent conclusion on this fact had it 
considered other land use tools for 
protecting the character of the land, 
such as limits on the type, size, and 
location of structures on the lots, or 
that the original lot lines might have 
been driven by the same rugged 
topography. 
The Court went on to ind that  
“[t]he value added by the lots’ combi-
nation shows their complementarity 
and supports their treatment as one 
parcel.” Id. at 1949. Accepting that 
the regulation diminished the value 
of Lot E, that diminution was offset 
by the increase in value to the two 
lots as combined: the combined lots 
were valued at $698,300, far greater 
than the total value of the separate 
regulated lots (Lot F with its cabin 
at $373,000, according to the state’s 
appraiser, and Lot E as an undevel-
opable plot at $40,000, according to 
Why logically does one 
parcel plus one parcel 
equal “a parcel as a whole” 
and not two parcels for 
purposes of the regulatory 
takings analysis? 
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the Murrs’ appraiser). On this point, 
the Court clearly afirmed the long-
held notion that effects of land use 
regulations are both positive and neg-
ative. Because the Murrs had used 
Lot E to serve Lot F, Lot E having 
no separate purposes, their merger, 
which produced an increase in total 
value, might seem unobjectionable, 
except that by doing so, the Murrs are 
largely foreclosed from putting Lot 
E to different purposes and denied 
the opportunity to realize its separate 
economic value. 
Outcome-Determinative
Treating the two lots as one seemed 
outcome-determinative; it reduced 
the regulatory impact from 100% of 
one lot to 10% of two lots, meaning 
not likely severe enough to require 
compensation and rendering the 
other elements of the takings test 
largely irrelevant. But the multi-factor 
test adopted was less outcome-deter-
minative than would have been the 
bright-line rules offered by both sides 
in the case. Rejecting a ixed meaning, 
the Court stated that it must deine 
“parcel” in a manner that relects 
reasonable expectations about the 
property. Id. at 1950. 
The state of Wisconsin urged that 
the deinition of the relevant parcel 
should be tied to state law, consid-
ering the two lots as a single whole 
as a result of their merger under the 
challenged regulations. But this posi-
tion would tend too much to the state 
and create the risk that a state might 
“deine the relevant parcel in a way 
that permits it to escape its responsi-
bility to justify regulation in light of 
legitimate property expectations.” Id. 
at 1946. 
In contrast, the Murrs insisted 
that the boundary lot lines should 
determine the relevant parcel. This 
proposition ignored that lot lines 
were creatures of state law, which 
can be overridden by the state in rea-
sonable exercise of its powers. The 
assertion also tended too far to one 
side, ignoring the well-settled reliance 
on merger provisions as a common 
means of achieving legitimate ends, 
such as preserving open space while 
allowing orderly development, their 
harshness often ameliorated through 
variances. Id. at 1947. See, e.g., Ness 
v. County of Crow Wing, No. A06-
1690, 2007 Minn. App. Unpub. LEXIS 
1202 (Minn. Ct. App. Dec. 18, 2007) 
(upholding merger provisions for 
valid land use purposes).  
Radical Inventions?
Although the dissent criticized the 
majority for incorporating new lay-
ers in the analysis that serve only to 
increase opacity, the dissent in turn 
did not acknowledge that a num-
ber of lower federal courts already 
had colored the analysis by introduc-
ing lexible variables toward a more 
nuanced determination of the rel-
evant parcel. See Loveladies Harbor, 
Inc. v. United States, 28 F.3d 1171, 1181 
(Fed. Cir. 1994) (“[o]ur precedent dis-
plays a lexible approach, designed 
to account for factual nuances”). For 
those courts, the intuitive starting 
point was whether the parcels are 
contiguous property and held by the 
same owner at the time the taking 
occurred. In Forest Properties, Inc. v. 
United States, 177 F.3d 1360, 1365 (Fed. 
Cir.), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 951 (1999), 
contiguous parcels, although one sub-
merged and another above ground, 
were treated as a whole. But, in Palm 
Beach Isles Associates v. United States, 
208 F.3d 1374, 1381, aff’d on rehear-
ing, 231 F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2000), 
because 50 acres of a larger 261-acre 
parcel were situated across the road 
and physically remote, they were 
treated as separate. 
Contiguity alone is insuficient 
because the courts also consider 
other practical and economic condi-
tions linking the parcels, such as time 
of purchase and common inancing. 
See Ciampitti v. United States, 22 Cl. 
Ct. 310, 321 (1991) (owner treated the 
lots as a single parcel for purposes of 
purchase and inancing, which were 
inextricably linked). Parcels included 
in the same development plan or held 
by the owner as a single economic 
unit also may be treated as one. In 
Lost Tree Village Corp. v. United States, 
707 F.3d 1286, 1294 (Fed. Cir. 2013), 
aff’d, 787 F.3d 1111 (Fed. Cir. 2015), 
cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 2325 (2017), 
the relevant parcel did not include 
a nearby developed lot because the 
landowner did not treat them as part 
of the same “economic unit.” See also 
Palm Beach Isles Assocs., 208 F.3d at 
1381 (development of one parcel was 
physically and temporally remote 
from, and legally unconnected to, 
the other; combining the two simply 
because at one time they were under 
common ownership cannot be justi-
ied); Loveladies Harbor, Inc., 28 F.3d at 
1181 (contiguous land developed and 
sold before enactment of regulation 
treated as separate parcel). But see 
Norman v. United States, 429 F.3d 1081, 
1091 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (the landown-
ers “regarded the 2280-acre parcel as 
a single economic unit”); Appolo Fuels, 
Inc. v. United States, 381 F.3d 1338, 
1346 (Fed. Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 543 
U.S. 1188, (2005) (contiguous leases 
were part of “one uniied mining 
plan”). 
State courts also have gone 
beyond legal deinitions of a parcel 
State courts have gone 
beyond legal deinitions 
of a parcel in deining 
the relevant parcel, 
inding that contiguous 
parcels under common 
ownership may be 
treated as one.
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in deining the relevant parcel, ind-
ing that contiguous parcels under 
common ownership may be treated 
as one. See Giovanella v. Conservation 
Comm’n of Ashland, 857 N.E.2d 451 
(Mass. 2006) (contiguous lots with 
same uses and zoning); K & K Const., 
Inc. v. Dep’t of Natural Resources, 575 
N.W.2d 531 (Mich. 1998), cert. denied, 
525 U.S. 819 (1998) (three contiguous 
parcels under common ownership); 
Bevan v. Brandon Twp., 475 N.W.2d 37, 
amended, 439 Mich. 1202 (1991), cert. 
denied, 502 U.S. 1060 (1992) (contigu-
ous lots under common ownership); 
Zealy v. City of Waukesha, 548 N.W.2d 
528 (Wis. 1996) (separately-zoned 
parts of 10.4 contiguous acres consti-
tuted the denominator). 
At the same time, noncontiguous 
parcels are more likely to be treated 
as separate property by state courts. 
In East Cape May Assoc. v. New Jer-
sey, 777 A.2d 1015 (N.J. Super. App. 
Div. 2001), the court applied a set of 
ten nonexclusive factual questions 
and concluded that noncontiguous, 
separately purchased, and separately 
zoned and developed tracts were sep-
arate parcels. 
Just as in the federal courts, state 
courts have treated otherwise sep-
arate parcels held by their owners 
as part of the same economic unit 
or development plan as one for 
purposes of determining the denomi-
nator. Giovanella, 857 N.E.2d at 460–61 
(contiguous parcels, purchased at 
the same time and intended for same 
development); K & K Const., 575 
N.W.2d at 581 (parcels connected 
through a proposed development 
scheme and permit applications); 
Chapman v. Conservation Comm’n, 987 
N.E.2d 619 (Mass. App. Ct. 2013)(sub-
division consisting of 140 lots was the 
relevant parcel, not just the two lots 
burdened); Dunes West Golf Club, LLC 
v. Town of Mount Pleasant, 737 S.E.2d 
601, 615–18 (S.C. 2013) (including all 
256 acres of the golf course property 
and not just the discrete portion sub-
ject to the development for residential 
use); FIC Homes of Blackstone, Inc. v. 
Conservation Comm’n of Blackstone, 673 
N.E.2d 61 (Mass. App. Ct. 1996) (lots 
purchased within same subdivision 
on same date). 
A Shape-Shifting Thing
Perhaps the only thing that is clear 
from Murr is that the regulatory tak-
ings doctrine is a shape-shifting 
thing—evolving and lexing, ind-
ing form in the context to which it 
is applied, and the inventions intro-
duced there are not certain to make 
the lines more deinite and results 
more admired. 
Property is said to be a legal con-
struct, with signiicance in terms 
of rights and limits on those rights 
and protections against intrusions 
on those rights. Before Murr, fairly 
settled conventions determined the 
thing to which the laws of prop-
erty applied—legal descriptions as 
manifested on the ground—and this 
remains so for most purposes. But 
now, will a state or local government 
be able to preempt or circumvent tak-
ings challenges, simply by how it, 
even from a post hoc perspective, 
characterizes or deines the physical 
dimensions of property? The “tak-
ings-speciic” meaning of property, to 
be applied irst to determine whether 
there is property and second to deter-
mine whether there has been a taking, 
as the dissent in Murr maintained, 
will almost always portend this 
result. The multi-factor test adopted 
in Murr and being used in the lower 
courts for deining the parcel seems 
only to describe what a state has done 
but does not otherwise constrain 
what it can do. In other words, just 
because two lots can nominally be 
regarded as one parcel for purposes 
of the state’s land use policies does 
not mean the decision to merge them 
should be beyond the Court’s scru-
tiny as a taking or that they should be 
regarded as one for purposes of regu-
latory takings analysis. 
In evaluating the parcel-as-a-
whole concept, it seems important to 
bear in mind what the concept origi-
nally aimed to do—prevent an owner 
from identifying a single thread in 
his bundle of ownership rights and 
claim a taking. As Chief Justice Rob-
erts asserts in his dissent, there is 
no risk of single-thread selection by 
giving regard to the boundary lines 
between parcels already drawn by the 
states. 137 S. Ct. at 1953. As it is now 
deined, not only does the “parcel as 
a whole” concept not reveal or assess 
the severity of the economic impact 
from regulation, but also it may oper-
ate to mask it. n
Perhaps the only thing 
that is clear from  
is that the regulatory 
takings doctrine is a 
shape-shifting thing.
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